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ABSTRACT
Alternative corporate tax systems differ in their ability to adapt to
changes in the rate of inflation. Absent complete indexing of depreciation
allowances, a tax system may use the expected inflation rate to setaccelerated
depreciation allowances in a way that minimizes the welfareloss from the
misallocation of capital. This welfare loss is a nonlinear functionof
the assumed inflation rate, however, so the welfare loss at the expected
inflation rate may be quite different from the expected welfareloss. We
compute these two welfare concepts for each ofthree alternative corporate
tax schemes in the U.S. and for two different relationshipsbetween infla-
tion and interest rates. One important finding is that theAuerbach—
Jorgenson first year recovery plan is not equivalentto indexing as is
often claimed, if uncertainty about inflation implies uncertaintyabout
thereal after—tax discount rate.
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The design of a good tax system is often limited by compromises
among several competing objectives. One's view of vertical equity may
require a more progressive tax system for example, but this redistribu-
tion may increase excess burden and thus reduce economic efficiency.
One's view of horizontal equity may require a more comprehensive tax
base, but inclusions of imputed income or consumption items maymakethe
tax system more complicated and reduce administrative efficien:y.As a
final example, policymakers might like to be able to change tax rules
in reaction to business cycles or other new circumstances, but this flexi-
bility conflicts with the goal of providing a certain tax environment for
investors.
Efficiency and equity of various tax systems have been thurougily
studied in the literature of public finance. In this paper, we wouLd like
to compare alternative tax systems with respect to a slightly different
goal, a goal we call "adaptability." Quite often, tax rules must be set
for an indefinite period, before uncertainty about economic variables has
been resolved. Yet we would like these fixed tax rules to adapt automati-
cally to changes in these economic variables, without having to enact new
rules. In particular, we would like the tax system to maintain its
desired equity and efficiency properties in the face of inflation rates
other than the single rate that might be expected.
Complete indexation would clearly help maintain the equity and effi-
ciency of existing taxes across a variety of inflation outcomes, but this
adaptability comes at the expense of considerable administrative diffi-
culties. In practice, we are left with simpler schemes based on nominal—2—
income, fixed depreciation schedules, and historical cost accounting.
Because assets vary in the extent to which actual allowances differ from
economic depreciation at replacement cost, these schemes distort invest—
inent incentives, misallocate capital, and reduce overall welfare. For
our purposes, however, it is important to note that inflation has different
impacts on the incentive to invest in different assets. A given deprecia-
tion scheme may tax assets similarly at one rate of inflation and very
dissimilarly at another. As a consequence, when policymakers choose among
competing tax schemes on the basis of economic efficiency, they may have
to use more than a single value for the expected rate of inflation. A
more appropriate criterion may be the expected welfare cost rather than the
welfare cost at the expected inflation rate.
In this paper, we compute these two welfare concepts for each of three
alternative corporate tax schemes in the U.S. The first scheme is based
on the set of allowances that existed in 1980; the second is based on the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) as amended in 1982; and the third
is based on the first year recovery plan of Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980).
One important finding is that this first year recovery plan is not equi-
valent to indexing as is often claimed, if uncertainty about inflation
implies uncertainty about the real after—tax return used for discounting.
For each scheme, we use a cost—of—capital formula similar to the one
in Hall and Jorgenson (1967) to measure the incentive to invest in each of
33 assets. We then employ Cobb—Douglas demands for these assets in a
partial equilibrium framework like that of Harberger (1966) to measure
the welfare cost of differential incentives. This welfare cost for any
one scheme depends nonlinearly on the rate of inflation used in the cost—
of—capital formula. We plot this welfare cost, and we find that it is a—3—
convex function of the assumed inflation rate. As a consequence, the
welfare cost for the expected inflation rate (a point on thecurve) can
be a substantial underestimate of the expected welfare cost (obtained
by weighting together the welfare costs of the different possible infla—
tion rates).
We look at a very particular kind of uncertainty in thispaper.
Policymakers face an uncertain environment when they must chooseamong
alternative tax systems, but we assume that this uncertainty is resolved
before investment takes place. This scenario is clearly counterfactual,
but it allows us to study all of the relevant adaptability andefficiency
issues discussed above while at the same time abstract fromcomplex issues
of how uncertainty affects investment incentives.In particular, it allows
us to use the simple cost—of—capital formula for a firm facing certain
rates of return and inflation.
Since this cost—of—capital formula and the Harberger excess burden
formula have been exposited many times, the next section offers only the
briefest possible summary of our methodology. We then outline one case
where uncertainty about inflation causes uncertainty about the real after—
tax rate of return, and another case where it does not. Section 3 makes
these formulas operational with a brief description of the three alternative
tax schemes, but again more complete expositions are available elsewhere.
Section 4 provides discussion of our results, and Section 5 draws conclusions.
2. Methodological Framework
As in Hall and Jorgenson (1967), we consider a firm facing a certain
nominal interest rate i and inflation rate 7T.Thefirm makes a one—
dollar marginal investment in asset jthatdepreciates exponentially at—4—
rate .andearns a marginal product c.. Income from the asset is taxed
at the statutory corporate rate u. The firm receives animmediate invest-
ment tax credit at rate k. and delayed depreciation allowances on a
fraction of the original purchase price given by the parameter a..The
present value of these allowances per dollarof basis is z., where the
firm discounts nominal future allowances by the nominal after—taxinterest
rate i(l—u). We thus assume arbitrage between debt andreal capital as
in Bradford and Fullerton (1981).
The profit—maximizing firm continues to make such investments until,
in competitive equilibrium, the net cost of the asset (1—k.)is just
equal to the present discounted value of after—tax returnsand tax savings
from the asset. This equilibrium condition is used to solvefor the
marginal product or rental cost c as a functionof other parameters:
i(l—u) —Tf + 5.
c. (1 -k.-ua.z.). (1)
1—u jjj
Thiscost is gross of depreciation and taxes, so the pre—taxreturn net
of depreciation is p. =c•—5..This pre—tax return can easily vary
among assets with different depreciationrates and/or allowances z.
Depreciation indexing, however, could be set so thatthe firm receives
economic allowances at replacement cost. The firm discountsby s, defined
here as the certain real after—tax return i(l—u) —. Thus,in this case,
z. equals 5/(s+3.)andreduces to s/(1—u) for all assets.If the
3 j 3' 3
totalcorporate capital stock is fixed, the tax systemdoes not distort
its allocation in this case.
Ingeneral, taxes do distort the allocationof capital among assets.
Inthis paper, we follow Hendershott and Hu (1980)and Gravelle (1982)—5—
in measuring the associated welfare cost by the Harberger formula:
N
W = dc.dK. , (2)
3=1 L
whereK. is the stock of asset jinthe undistorted equilibrium, K is the
stock in the distorted equilibrium, and N is the number of assets.To
measure W, therefore, we need to know how the use of K. depends upon its
cost c. Econometric studies reviewed in Jorgenson (1974) suggest that
firms' total use of capital changes by approximately one percent for each
one percent change in its cost. This cost could conceivably be gross or
net of depreciation, but gross costs are used in empirical work finding
that gross output is a Cobb—Douglas function of capital and labor. No
empirical work has measured price elasticities for each of the 33 cipital
assets used in this study, but we assume that the demand for each K. has
unitary elasticity with respect to its price c..
Expenditure on each type of capital is a constant under our asuumptions,
so dc. in equation (2) can be expressed as a function of K..Ihat Ls, cK. =
3 3 33
cKfor any K, so dc =cK/K.—c.If c• denotes costs in the
33 3 j333 3 1
undistortedequilibrium, then further algebra provides:
N
wY cK[2n(c/c)-1+ c/c.] (3)
j1
1
For the distorted equilibrium, capital costs c are given by equation
(1) and capital use K is required data. We obtain the distorted capital
allocation for 1980 from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), and we estimate
the long—run distorted allocation for the other tax plans by using—6—
the same Cobb—Douglas reactions. Under ACRS, for example, K is given by
capital expenditures under 1980 law divided by capital costs underACRS.
For the undistorted (counterfactual) equilibrium, capital costs
should be the same for all assets, but again these capital costs could
be net or gross of depreciation. We wish to abstract from theconsider-
able debate on this issue, but we follow Bradford (1980) in noting that
welfare maximization requires the highest sustainable flow of net output,
achieved where net marginal products are equated. Thus undistorted costs
c. are derived as (p + 3), where p is a constant.Our particular choice
for p is the capital—weighted average of p' from the distorted equilibrium,
such that both equilibria have the same aggregate pre—tax return,the same
aggregate after—tax return, and the same total tax revenue.
Once we have data on tax parameters from the next section, equations
(1) and (3) together provide capital costs and welfare costs asfunctions
of i and ri.These two parameters could be specified independently for a
number of possible cases, but there is further reason to believe thatthe





where i0 is the interest rate in the absence of inflation. Inthe first
relationship, called Modified Fisherts Law (NFL) by Bradfordand Fullerton
(1981), inflation adds more than point—for—point to thenominal interest
rate. This relationship insures that s, thereal after—tax rate of return,—7—
is invariant with respect to inflation. Frauineni and Jorgenson (1980) provide
some evidence in support of this proposition, but it need not be viewed as
an empirical relationship. Instead, we may wish to make the ceteris paribus
assumption that s is fixed as we look at different 'IT.Equation (4b) has
been called Strict Fisher's Law (SFL), as inflation adds exactly point—for—
point to nominal interest. Summers (1981) and others suggest that this is
an empirical upper bound on the impact of inflation.
In one set of calculations below, we set i at .04, use equation (4a),
0
vary inflation, and calculate W as a function of Ti.Policymakers face
uncertainty about TI, but equation (4a) insures that s is always 4 percent.
In a second set of calculations, we set i such that the real after—tax rate 0
ofreturn is .04 when inflation is 7 percent. We then vary Ti in equation
(4b) such that the real after—tax return varies with inflation.In this
case, because s depends on 'ii, uncertainty about inflation createsfurther
uncertainty about the after—tax rate of return. In either case, W can be
written as W(Tr). We assume that policymakers face a distribution of possible
inflation rates centered around a mean of 7 percent. For computational
simplicity, we use an approximate uniform distribution, where each'inflation
rate between 1 percent and 13 percent is equally likely, but other distri-
butions would yield similar results. Where E is the expectations operator,
we show how E[W(Ti)] differs from W[E(Ti)].
3. The Specification of Alternative Tax Regimes
We start with a description of credits and allowances that existed
in 1980, before President Reagan's recent tax reform initiatives. We
then describe the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) as introduced
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and amended in the Tax—8—
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). Finally, we describe
an alternative scheme suggested by Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980). More
description of these tax plans and their modelling can be found in Fullerton
and Henderson (1983). For all of these reforms, we assume that the firm
can use all credits and allowances on depreciable assets, and LIFO account-
ing for inventories, in order to minimize taxes .Thereal return to
land and inventories, as well as other taxable income, is subject to the
statutory rate u given by the top corporate rate bracket of 46 percent.
For each plan, we evaluate incentives to invest in each of the 33
asset types listed in Table 1. The first 20 assets are types of equipment,
the next 11 are types of structures, and the last two are inventories and
land. We treat each of these assets as individually homogenous, in the
sense that each has a single tax treatment and economic depreciation rate
(cS). Hulten and Wykoff (1981) provide estimatesof f, shown in column 1
of Table 1.
As of 1980, the investment tax credit stood at a ten percent rate for
all public utility structures (assets 24—28) and for equipment with tax
lifetimes of at least seven years. The credit was 6.7 percent for equip-
ment with a lifetime of at least five years (assets 4 and 14) and 3.3
percent for equipment with a lifetime of at least three years (asset15).
These rates are shown in column 2 of Table 1.
The Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System, in effect in 1980, allowed
firms to depreciate equipment and public utility structures over lifetimes
given by 80 to 120 percent of the many diverse "Guideline"lifetimes that
were set in 1962. Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) estimated guidelinelife-
times for each of our more aggregate asset categories, but we assume that
firms minimize taxes. We therefore use 80 percent of these guideline—9—
lifetimes for eligible assets, unless that choice would raise taxes by
lowering the investment tax credit. Computers, for example, could be
depreciated over 5 years with a 6.7 percent credit, but taxes are lower
if the firm uses 7 years in order to receive the 10 percent credit. Tax
minimizing lifetimes for all assets are shown in column 3 of Table 1.
Also,in 1980, equipment and public utility property were eligible
for double declining balance (DDB) or sum—of—the—years'—digits (SYD)
methods of depreciation. If we define L as the asset's lifetime for tax
purposes, then DDB allows depreciation equal to 2/L of the remaining basis
each year. Because of the half—year convention, however, all assets are
assumed to have been purchased on July 1. They receive half of the DDB
amount (that is, i/L) in the year of purchase, leaving a basis of (1—i/L).
They then receive 2/L of this remaining basis in the first full year of
ownership. At this point, as shown in Fullerton and Henderson (1983), the
firm would minimize taxes by switching to SYD. If there are 3.5 years left
(as for a 5 year asset), the firm takes the basis remaining at the time of
the switch and divides it over the remaining years according to the frac-
tions obtained by using a denominator of 8.0 and numerators of 3.5, 2.5, 1.5,
and 0.5.
For other structures firms could use 150 percent of declining balance
(l.5/L of remaining basis each year), with an optimal switch to straight—
line after one—third of the life of the asset. These depreciation allowances,
specified by law over a finite number of years for each asset, are dis-
counted by the firm's nominal after—tax rate of return because allowances
are based on historical cost. Since the entire purchase price was depreci-
able in 1980, we use 1.0 for the parameter a..— 10—
Wehave now specified enough information to calculate the equilibrium
pre—tax return, or net marginal product, under 1980 law for each asset.
These are shown in column 4 of Table 1 for the case of a 7 percent rate
of inflation and fixed 4 percent real after—tax rate of return. Because
of credits and accelerated depreciation allowances in 1980, the required pre-
tax return on investment in equipment is considerably less than that of other
assets. Land and inventories receive "economic" depreciation allowances at
rate zero, since they do not depreciate, but inflation reduces the real
value of allowances on some structures to less than economic depreciation
at replacement cost. Associated welfare losses could be reduced by moving
resources from low to high marginal product investments, until the net
marginal products were equated. The next section discusses estimatesof
welfare cost.
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) was introduced in 1981
and amended in 1982. It establishes an investment tax credit of six per-
cent for autos (asset 15) and ten percent for all other equipment and
public utility property. These credit rates are shown in column 5of
Table 1. For lifetimes, the law assigns three years to autos, five years
to other equipment, ten years to some public utility structures,and fifteen
years to other structures. These lifetimes areshown in column 6. The
1981 law specified a transition to more accelerated depreciation schedules,
but the 1982 law repealed the transition and left equipment and public
utility structures at 150 percent of declining balance with an optimal
switch to straight line after one—third of the life of the asset. It
also reduced depreciable bases by one—half the investment tax credit, so
a. is .97 for autos and .95 for other equipmentand public utility pro-
perty. Other structures receive 175 percentof declining balance with an—ii—
optimal switch to straight line after three—sevenths of the life of the
asset (see Fullerton and Henderson, 1983).
Pre—tax returns for this 1982 version of ACRS are shown in column 7
of Table 1, for the case of 7 percent inflation and fixed 4 percent real
after—tax return. Most types of equipment experience reductions from
1980 law, and most pay very small taxes in the sense that the pre—tax
returns barely exceed the 4 percent after—tax return to the corporation.
Taxes on structures are also reduced, but nondepreciable assets are un-
affected. King and Fullerton (1984, Chapter 6) find that the new cor-
porate tax system provides a net subsidy to investment, when they add
consideration of debt finance, interest deductions, and additional personal
taxes. In their model, the total tax wedge rises when the corporate tax
and all allowances are eliminated.
The Auerbach—Jorgenson (AJ) first year recovery plan would provide
the firm with one depreciation deduction at the time the asset is purchased.
It would eliminate the investment tax credit and calculate the one—time
deduction as the present value of economic depreciation. Policymakers
could use the Hulten—Wykoff estimates of exponential depreciation rates
(a.)anddiscount at the real after—tax interest rate (s) to obtain the
deduction (z.) as a./(s +a.).Substitution into equation (1) implies
that a. equals s/(l—u) for all j, so the tax scheme appears not to distort
the allocation of capital among assets. Pre—tax returns on all assets
are .0741, for comparison with the varying pre—tax returns found in column
4 or column 7 of Table 1. This neutrality, however, depends on the accuracy
of economic depreciation rates and the firm's real after—tax discount rate
that are used by policymakers to set the first year deduction. If the firm
uses different depreciation rates or a different discount rate, then the— 12—
requiredpre—tax rate of return that it faces may not be the same for all
assets.
We have no way here to judge the quality of depreciation rate estimates,
but we are concerned with the discount rate used to set the first year
allowance. Under Modified Fisher's Law, as described above, uncertainty
about inflation does not create uncertainty about the after—tax return.
If policymakers can accurately estimate this fixed after—tax return used
for discounting, then they can set the first year allowance for each asset
such that pre—tax returns are all equal. Under Strict Fisher's Law, however,
after—tax returns fall with inflation. Policymakers might use the expected
s to discount economic depreciation and set the first year allowances, but
firms generally evaluate their investment incentives after policy has been
set and after they have more information about s. If they use a discount
rate other than the one used by government, then the present value of
depreciation may not equal the first year allowance, and pre—tax returns
may vary. To avoid interasset distortions in this case, economic deprecia-
tion must be allowed as it occurs, completely indexed for inflation.
4. Welfare Results
For each tax scheme, a given rate of inflation can be used in equation
(4a) or (4b) to get the nominal interest rate, in equation (1) to get pre-
tax returns, and in equation (3) to estimate welfare costs from differential
taxation of assets. Rather than report absolute dollar amounts, however,
we find it useful to express welfare costs as a fraction of estimated tax
revenue. This ratio is not limited to prices of a particular year,and it
provides a useful measure of the efficiency of each tax. For revenuein
the denominator, we use the aggregate difference between pre—tax returns— 13—
andafter—tax returns, as measured by ,K.(p.
—s).This denominator
is not the actual revenue in any particular year, but it indicates the
long—run annual amount that could be collected by the relevant tax scheme
if all investments were financed by equity and earned the hypothesized
returns.
When ACRS lumped many diverse kinds of equipment into a single five—
year category, and many kinds of structures into a single fifteen—year
category, it effectively abandoned any attempt to provide allowances
based on economic depreciation. It introduced new variance among required
pre—tax returns, but it achieved its primary objective of providing
investment incentives by reducing those pre—tax returns. As a result,
welfare cost ratios tend to be higher under ACRS than under the 1980 law,
both because absolute welfare costs are higher and because long run
revenues are lower.
In designing the 1980 law or ACRS, policymakers may have expected
a particular rate of inflation, and they may have set accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances at least partly to offset the tax—raising effects of histori-
cal cost depreciation. If either tax law is fixed while inflation turns out
to be very low, however, then equipment is highly subsidized and structures
are less highly taxed. Long run revenues from depreciable assets can be
arbitrarily small, and welfare cost ratios can be arbitrarily high. Increased
inflation then raises the tax on equipment more than on structures, makes
pre—tax returns more similar, raises long—run revenue, and reducesthe
welfare cost ratio. This falling welfare cost ratio is plotted against
the inflation rate for each tax law in Figure 1, assuming Modified Fisher's
Law of equation (4a). Real after—tax rates of return are fixed in this case,
nwelfarecosts under the Auerbach-JorgeflSOfl plan are measured at zero.— 14—
Thecost—of—capital and excess burden framework in this paper is not
new. Many studies have used a similar framework to measure the welfare
costs from differential taxation of assets. Most of these studies use a
single expected rate of inflation, however, and report a single welfare
cost estimate. Figure 1 indicates two major problems with this approach.
First, the rapidly falling curves indicate that welfare cost is very sensitive
to the choice for a single rate of inflation. Second, even with a good
estimate of the expected inflation rate, E(ri), the welfare cost W{E()J may
be a poor substitute for the expected welfare cost E{W(Tr)}. We use as
an example the case where inflation rates between 1 percent and 13 percent
are equally likely, while the real after—tax interest rate is 4 percent.
If only the expected 7 percent inflation rate is used in equations (4a),
(1), and (3), we find that welfare cost under the 1980 law is 2.8 percent
of long run revenues. This point can be taken from the curve in Figure 1,
at 7 percent inflation. All points on the curve are equally likely, however.
and the mean of the different possible welfare cost outcomes under 1980 la;
is almost 4 percent of revenue. Under ACRS, W[E(T)] is 3.5 percent of
revenue, while E[W(IT)] is 4.8 percent of revenue. In general, because
the curve is convex to the horizontal axis,E[W('rr)]is greater than
W[E@T)] for any distribution of inflation rates
The same two problems are apparent in Figure 2 for the caseof Strict
Fisher's Law in equation (4b). Uncertainty aboutinflation in this case
implies further uncertainty about thereal after—tax rate of return. Again
welfare cost ratios are very sensitive to theinflation rate, and again
the curves are convex. The welfare cost ratio at7 percent inflation under—
estimates the correct expected welfare cost ratio by22 percent under 1980
law and by 13 percent under ACRS.— 15—
Inflationreduces the real value of depreciation allowances, but it
does not affect the relatively high tax on nondepreciable assets such
as land and inventories. Thus, up to a point in Figure 2, inflation
reduces welfare costs by raising taxes on equipment and structures. Once
the cost of depreciable capital exceeds the cost of nondepreciable capital,
however, further inflation makes them less equal and raises welfare costs.
This turning point is reached at 11 percent inflation under 1980 law and at
12 percent inflation under ACRS. (The same phenomenon occurs with >todified
Fishers Law, but the rate of inflation would have to exceed 13 percent
before it erodes the real value of depreciation allowances enouch to make
the cost of equipment and structures as high on average as the cost of
land and inventories.)
As can be seen in Figure 2, the Auerbach—Jorgenson plan is no Longer
neutral in the case where the inflation outcome may affect the real after—
tax return, that is, where s may be written s(). Policymakers must use
a single rate such as the expected after—tax return E(s) to discount economic
depreciation and set the first year allowance. The AJ deduction must be
set long before investment takes place, however, so firms may be able
to obtain much more information about s.In the extreme case of this paper,
where all uncertainty is resolved before the firm invests, therequired
pre—tax return may be written as




Ifs turns out to equal E(s), then p. reduces to s/(l—u) for all
assets, and the tax is nondistorting. Given our approximate uniform distri-
bution, as an example, policymakers would use the expected 7 percent inflation— 16—
rateand the expected 4 percent discount rate to set the first year
allowances. If expectations are realized, Figure 2 hows that welfare
costs are zero. If inflation is anything other than 7 percent, then s
does not equal E(s), and equation (5) shows that p. depends on f. Different
assets have different pre—tax returns, and the tax is no longerneutral.
Welfare costs rise above zero for inflation rates less than 7 percent or
more than 7 percent, so Figure 2 also shows a convex functionfor welfare
cost ratios under AJ. Welfare costs at the expected rate of inflation are
zero, but the mean of the equally likely welfare cost outcomesis .5 percent
of revenues.
A final interesting aspect of Figure 2 is that the three curves
cross. While ACRS has the highest welfare cost ratiofor most inflation
outcomes, it is not necessarily the most distortingof the three tax pro-
posals.If the inflation rate is 10, 11, or 12 percent, under our assumed
parameters, then welfare costs from the 1980 law are larger as a propor-
tion of revenues. If inflation turns out to be 13 percent, under deductions
set for the expected 7 percent rate, then the Auerbach—Jorgenson plan is
most distorting. If we do not know the inflation rate before we choose a
tax plan, then we cannot know that our choice will minimize excess burden.
We could choose the plan with the lowest expected welfare cost, but any
plan might turn out to have the highest welfare cost.
5. Conclusion
Tax policy is limited by the fact that laws must be set in anuncertain
environment. Fixed depreciation schedules designed for a periodof high
inflation may not perform well during periods of low inflation,and vice
versa. Recognizing that legislative changes can be slow, a goodtax law— 17—
wouldbe "adaptable" enough to operate efficiently over a range of
economic outcomes.
We compare the efficieficy of three possible tax schemes for the U.S.
under a variety of parameter outcomes. When uncertainty about inflation
creates uncertainty only about the nominal interest rate, we find that
investment distortions cause greater welfare losses under ACRS than under
1980 law for all levels of inflation. As welfare losses decline with
inflation, the difference between the two laws becomes small. In addition,
because welfare costs are a convex function of the inflation rate, the
expected welfare cost can be significantly greater than the welfare cost
measured at the expected inflation rate.
As long as policymakers can correctly identify the firm's real after—
tax discount rate in order to calculate the present value of economic
depreciation, the Auerbach—Jorgenson first year recovery plan does not
distort the choice among assets. When uncertainty extends to the after—
tax rate of return, however, AJ may no longer be neutral. First year
deductions may be set using the expected after—tax return, but the cost—of—
capital varies among assets if firms use a different after—tax return to
discount economic depreciation. Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) are correct
that "these allowances would be unaffected by inflation or by variations
in its rate," (p. 117),but the point is thatneutrality would uire
the allowance to react when inflation variability affects the after—tax
return.
Our results indicate that policymakers cannot know with certainty which
tax plan will cause the smallest welfare cost. The Auerbach—Jorgenson
planperforms best for a wide range of inflation outcomes, but itswelfare
costratio rises rapidly at high inflation where government has over—— 18—
estimatedthe real after—tax return. If ex post indexing is not an option,
then policymakers may wish to set first—year deductions by systematically
underestimating the real after—tax discount rate. Such a policy would
minimize the chance that large losses would occur under AJ. At the
extreme, with the use of a zero discount rate, this policy would imply
fully expensing of new investments and an associated loss of tax revenue.
Absent ex post indexing, full expensing is the only policy certain to avoid
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